Iran’s Shahed drones—particularly the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136—have contained a strikingly high proportion of American-made components, according to multiple investigations. Ukrainian intelligence discovered that 77 percent of the parts in one recovered Shahed-136 were produced by 13 U.S. companies. Meanwhile, Conflict Armament Research (CAR), a British group analyzing four Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—one Shahed-131, two Shahed-136s, and one Mohajer-6—found that 82 percent of their parts originated in the United States.

These American components serve diverse functions in the drones, from navigation and data processing to control systems. In many cases, they are mass-produced or commercially available chips that can be repurposed for military use, making them difficult to track once sold through multiple distributors or intermediaries. Although U.S. companies generally maintain rigorous compliance programs to avoid selling restricted technology to sanctioned entities, the small size and ubiquity of microchips, combined with global reseller networks, create substantial loopholes that Iranian operators can exploit.

The issue illustrates a broader challenge in international export control: U.S.-made parts, designed for the consumer market, can be diverted—often through convoluted trade routes—to power Iran’s drone program. Even though Washington has long enforced sanctions and strict regulations on dual-use items, Iran’s reliance on American technology persists, raising questions about how best to strengthen oversight of global supply chains.